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This case study – and accompanying teaching note – briefly describes the history of the 
Espírito Santo family, a banking dynasty who led one of Portugal’s leading economic and 
financial groups, along with its “crown jewel”, Banco Espírito Santo. It chronicles how 
the corporate governance issues at BES allowed the family to exploit the bank, its 
shareholders and its customers, so as to support its unprofitable non-financial businesses. 
This left the bank in a poor financial situation, which deteriorated beyond control, leaving 
regulators – whose actions are also analysed here – with no alternative, amidst a severe 
liquidity crisis, but to apply a resolution measure, pinning large losses on junior 
bondholders and shareholders before recapitalising the bank. 
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The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 
The fall and resolution of Banco Espírito Santo 
“We usually say that first comes the interest of our country, second, that of 
the institution and, only in third, the shareholders” 
– Ricardo Espírito Santo Silva Salgado, CEO 1992-2014i 
It was an unusually bright, sunny morning on Friday, 1st August 2014, at least 
by London standards. George Lemon, a trader working in the fixed income desk at the 
offices of a Swiss asset manager, had come in a little later than usual that day. He was 
still waiting for his tea to cool down when a blinking red block on one of his screens 
startled him. Clicking through, he found that a bond on which he had a small position was 
freefalling. He got rid of it, but the damage was done. Small as his exposure to those 
7.15% junior bonds of Banco Espírito Santo SA (BES) may have been, the tumble was 
huge – the securities dipped as low as 15% of face value. He got out before that, but still, 
in his head, he could already hear his boss rambling over the losses. 
On Sunday night, the Portuguese central bank, Banco de Portugal (BdP), 
announced the resolution1 of BES, which had fallen in disgrace after, a few days earlier, 
posting a €3.6bn loss in 2014Q2. Its shares were finally halted from trading on Friday 
afternoon, already flatlining after having lost 50% that day and 40% the day before. The 
size of the losses consumed the existing capital buffer, depriving it from its access to 
central bank money. Without that vital source of liquidity, the bank had all but failed. 
The decision – which had been prepared over the previous days – was to remove 
BES’ sound assets and place them in a “transition bank”, creatively named Novo Banco 
(NB), “The New Bank”. The decades-old BES was to be liquidated, keeping only those 
assets deemed “toxic” in its balance sheet. While the shareholders – some of which had 
poured cash into BES in the rights issue that was held less than a couple of months before 
– and some junior bondholders were bailed-in2, depositors and senior bondholders also 
were safely moved to NB, along with €4.9bn of public funds. 
Lemon knew there were serious problems at BES’ parent companies – bad news 
related to this had even been at the core of a minor sell-off in European equities – but it 
                                                 
1 Resolution is defined by the European Commission (EC) as “the restructuring of a bank by a resolution 
authority, through the use of resolution tools, to ensure the continuity of its critical functions, preservation of financial 
stability and restoration of the viability of all or part of that institution, while the remaining parts are put into normal 
insolvency proceedings” (EC Memo 14/297). In Portuguese legislation, in line with European guidance, such resolution 
tools consist of transferring part or all of the bank’s activity either to another bank or to a purpose-built “bridge bank”. 
2 Bail-in refers to the write-off of failed banks’ debt, under the notion that the bank’s shareholders and 
creditors should bear all losses possible before public funds are used for its rescue. 
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seemed to him that the worst had passed. Even Goldman Sachs had bought into the bank 
just days before. What would happen to those who did not manage to sell them? And what 
now: trading at a massive yield of over 50%, should he buy in again? What’s more, he 
also had senior bonds of the bank – what will become of those? With yields at 6%, should 
he buy more? What about the shareholders? He pondered. How had it all come to this? 
How could the Espírito Santos (ES), the family who had controlled the bank since its 
foundation in the 1920s, have brought it to its knees?  
Espírito Santo: the originsii 
José Maria do Espírito Santo e Silva was born in Lisbon on May 13th 1850, to 
unknown parents. As was commonplace throughout Christian societies, unwanted babies 
were usually dropped off at the door of the nearest church or convent. In Portugal, it was 
custom for nuns and priests to name the unfortunate children they raise after Catholic 
symbols, and so they did with José Maria “of the Holy Spirit”. Whether or not they 
believed that smart little boy was somehow predestined for greater heights, they could 
not imagine that, 150 years later, the name they had given him was to become the 
trademark of one of the richest and most powerful families in Portugal. 
It is said that José Maria was actually the son of Simão da Silva Ferraz de Lima 
Castro, a powerful nobleman. Despite his absence, so goes the legend, he not only funded 
the boy’s education, but also, later, personally provided a loan for him to kick-start his 
adult life and career. Regardless of who provided the initial capital outlay, it is no legend 
that by 1869, at 19 years old, José Maria owned a small shop where he dealt in currency 
exchange and sold lottery tickets. Fittingly, it was located in old Lisbon, just down the 
street from where he was born, and was no less than the humble beginning of a banking 
and corporate empire. José Maria quickly outgrew the lottery business, moving on to real 
estate investments, asset management and commercial banking.  
By 1911, already a much respected and influent Lisbon banker, José Maria 
finally bought out the position of the only remaining associate in their commercial 
banking and securities trading firm. “Silva, Beirão, Pinto & Cia.” became “J.M. Espírito 
Santo Silva” – the first firm to bear his “Espírito Santo” name. Two years later, he would 
bring into the business his first heir, José Ribeiro: José Maria, a diabetic, felt his health 
was deteriorating, and wanted to leave the groundwork for his offspring to continue his 
life’s enterprise. In 1915, on Christmas night, he finally passed away. 
José Ribeiro had recently returned to Lisbon from high school in Scotland, and 
he immediately took charge of his father’s business. In 1920, he oversaw a new 
transformation, as it became Banco Espírito Santo SARL. During World War I, the 
Portuguese economy struggled. With strong inflation, the Escudo lost value very quickly. 
Many banks and other financial services firms buckled, but the ES weathered the storm. 
The bank grew steadily, but after Ricardo, José Ribeiro’s younger brother, took over as 
chairman, it really took off. In 1937, they acquired another bank, which they merged with 
the existing one, thus creating Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa (BESCL), 
then the leading privately-owned bank in Portugal. Ricardo, by then, was the main 
economic advisor of Oliveira Salazar, the sombre dictator who had just risen to power 
and used his influence to grow the bank’s business. 
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During World War II, Portugal maintained a “neutral” status, which made it a 
safe haven for Europe’s aristocracy and top businessmen to safeguard their assets and, 
often, their lives. Ricardo was not only a shrewd banker but also, with the help of his 
Jewish wife, Mary Cohen, a masterful host. He made the most of Portugal’s status, and 
during the war period, BESCL’s stock quadrupled in value as he welcomed European 
noblemen to his house and, to his bank, their assets. 
Ricardo would eventually die young, in 1955, and was succeeded by another 
brother, Manuel Ribeiro Espírito Santo. He would continue along the same pages, further 
developing international connections to wealthy families, such as the Rockefellers and 
Firestones, and to noblemen, like Juan Carlos, who would often seek refuge in Lisbon, at 
their house, from the troubles in Spain. In the 1960s, a golden era for the Portuguese 
economy dawned after its entrance in the European Free Trade Agreement. BESCL 
continued to grow, beginning to channel cash into several different businesses, from 
textiles to oil and gas. Under the authoritarian regime of Salazar, most business decisions 
were in one way or another very conditioned by central government power, and assets in 
all business fields were highly consolidated around a handful of large, well-connected 
conglomerates. For the large part, these were controlled by three traditional business 
dynasties: the Mellos, the Sommer-Champalimauds and the ES. 
Manuel died in 1973, in what would be the first of a succession of terrible events 
for the bank and the family. He was succeeded at the helm of the bank by his son Manuel 
Ricardo, but the oil crash brought a major slump to the world economy and, naturally, to 
business. The bank would be denied the chance to bounce back: the left-wing military 
coup that took place in Portugal in April 1974, deposing Salazar’s successor, would bring 
about chaotic, tense times, with many, if not all, of the country’s capitalists being stripped 
of their assets and either jailed or forced to flee abroad.  
On 11th March 1975, it was the ES’ turn. Amid great turmoil, as protesters 
gathered at the door of the bank’s iconic headquarters at Avenida da Liberdade, navy 
officers, with the help of some unionised bank employees friendly to the communist 
revolutionaries, took control of the building, barged into a board meeting, held the 
managers at gunpoint and sent them to jail. The bank, as well as all the major companies 
owned by the family, would soon be nationalised.  
Among the workers who flocked back to business when, a week later, normal 
activity resumed at the offices, was a young, bright middle manager. Ricardo Salgado, 
then 29, was asked to continue by the committee who took over. 
Ricardo Salgado, born to be a banker 
Ricardo Espírito Santo Silva Salgado was born in Cascais, Portugal, 25th June 
1944, the eldest son of Maria, daughter of Ricardo ES and Mary Cohen, and João Roma 
Salgado. Cascais, a seaside resort town on the outskirts of Lisbon, had long been the main 
base for most of the ES, and his childhood was spent there in frolic. As a teenager, 
however, he moved to Lisbon, having spent most of his time around the upper-class Lapa 
district, home to embassies and the house of parliament, where he finished both high 
school and university – where he studied Economics – followed by a year of military 
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service in the navy. 
A cousin of Manuel Ricardo, Salgado was the first male grandson of Ricardo ES 
and great-grandson of José Maria (see family tree in Exhibit 1). Nevertheless, his 
beginnings at BES were fairly humble, managing the unimportant economic studies team. 
By then, it was tradition that clan members must prove themselves valid to be able to 
progress, rather than being promoted solely on the basis of ‘pedigree’.  
Ricardo himself, though, quickly rose up the ranks at the bank and by 1973, 
already led the credit department, where he initially stayed after the uprising. Tolerated 
by the workers, he stayed, but not for long, as he fled the increasingly hostile environment 
of post-revolution Portugal, leaving on April 30th 1975. 
Exile and rebirth  
In Switzerland, Ricardo reunited with Mário Mosqueira do Amaral, a board 
member at BESCL who managed to avert jail: tipped off by a friendly employee, he did 
not show up at the office that day. The others would only be released on bail in July, then 
fleeing surreptitiously to Spain through a secondary border post and split up. 
As soon as September, however, Manuel Ricardo organized a “family” meeting 
in London with five other members: his brother António; António Ricciardi; the young 
Ricardo; Mosqueira and José Roquette. The latter two, though not of direct ES lineage, 
were regarded as such, having both been loyal employees and partners for a long time. 
This was the first meeting of what would become the group’s “Conselho Superior”, an 
unofficial institution where strategic decisions were made on a consensus basis, by 
representatives of the major branches of the family tree. 
The plan, then, was to leverage what they had left in order to rebuild their lost 
empire. They would have little assets of their own to begin with (the official story is they 
had as little as $20k in cash), but they benefited from widespread international contacts – 
the ES were known and respected by the most influential bankers of the world at the time, 
such as David Rockefeller or Walter Solomon (who provided them with office space in 
the City) – and the support of former customers and friends who, many having suffered 
the same fate as them, entrusted the bankers with the management of their remaining 
assets. One of the first measures was to create a holding company to ultimately centralize 
all the assets they would build upon, with roughly equal stakes to each of the six: 
Luxembourg-based Espírito Santo International (ESI). 
Over the ensuing years, business was based in Switzerland, Brazil and London, 
mostly around small private banking operations, with one exception. Ricardo and 
Roquette led a thriving operation in Brazil which had evolved into a retail bank by 1983, 
with the help of French Crédit Agricole (CA), as well as connections in Brazil’s 
government, who exempted them from paying a $2m fee for the banking licenses. 
Two additional overseas holdings were created: Espírito Santo Resources (ESR), 
to harbour non-financial interests, and Espírito Santo Financial Group (ESFG). By 1984, 
political conditions were ripe for the ES to begin their return to Portugal. Badly in need 
of capital, after a very tough decade since the revolution – having even twice resorted to 
the IMF, in 1978 and 1983 –, Portugal’s politicians, led by Socialist prime-minister Mário 
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Soares, called upon the country’s estranged capitalists. In 1985, they purchased a small 
investment bank and, the year after, they set up Banco Internacional de Crédito (BIC), a 
retail bank, again supported by CA.  
A couple of years later, as the first centre-right government took over since the 
revolution, a wave of reprivatisation operations began. Hand in hand with the French, in 
1990 they repurchased their former insurance company, Tranquilidade, and, finally, in 
July 1991, BESCL was back in the family’s hands. A large operation, it was significant 
even for the powerful CA, whose board was reluctant to make such a great investment in 
a single Portuguese bank. Mário Soares himself intervened, persuading his close friend, 
President François Mitterrand, to use his influence to get the French on board. 
Tragically, Manuel Ricardo would not witness such a triumph: he died in March 
1991. The eldest of the group, in accordance with tradition, Ricciardi took the lead. 
However, next in line of succession to Manuel Ricardo was actually his brother, António. 
And Ricardo, though the youngest of the pack, was widely recognised as their most 
capable. Ricciardi came up with a power division agreed upon by everyone: he would 
become the senior leader (chairing the top holding), Ricardo would manage their interests 
in financial services and António ES all the others. 
Initially, only 40% of BESCL’s capital was privatised. Through purpose-built 
holding BESPAR, 25%-owned by Crédit Agricole, and directly through ESFG, the family 
purchased over half, about 23%. The remainder was sold off early next year. As it was 
scattered by many different investors (many of which Portuguese capitalists friendly to 
the ES), the 35% they were finally left with gave them full control over the bank: overall, 
between the family, their French partners and a Luxembourg bank that also joined them, 
they spent just under 65bn Escudos (about €650miii, adjusted for inflation) to ensure 
possession of a majority stake in BES. Ricciardi became chairman, Salgado took over as 
CEO, with Mosqueira and José Manuel ES (another brother of Manuel Ricardo) joining 
the executive board. 
After 15 years of state ownership, BESCL had 8% of the Portuguese market by 
assets. Before, it was the largest private lender. At that time, the Portuguese banking 
sector was dominated by the state, with privately-owned banking groups timidly entering 
the market, such as Banco Comercial Português (BCP) and Banco Português de 
Investimento (BPI). Ricardo’s mission was to bring the bank back to the top. 
Growth 
By the mid-1990s privatisation of most of the other nationalised banks had taken 
place, leaving only Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), by far the largest, in the hands of 
the State, as it had been from its foundation. As the Portuguese economy grew steadily, 
despite the government budget and monetary restrictions imposed by the run-up to the 
Euro, banks also grew their business (Exhibit 2), but BCP was standing out, benefiting 
from the strong investment BCP’s founders had made in densifying its dependency 
network. Also, consolidation movements would mark the sector throughout these years, 
and BCP was the most aggressive of the pack. By 1995, with the purchase of Banco 
Português do Atlântico, it had taken first place (bar CGD). 
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Meanwhile, BESCL grew much more slowly, as the family – the controlling 
shareholders – focused on also growing other businesses, nationally and abroad, including 
the investment bank, BESI. It refrained from engaging in costly acquisitions, unlike its 
competitors, as the cash generated by the banking business was used to grow, instead, the 
ES conglomerate (broadly known as Grupo Espírito Santo – GES). Inclusively, BESCL 
only absorbed BIC by 1999, with the combination being named just Banco Espírito Santo 
(BES). 
With the turn of the century, though, a major deal was to be announced: the 
merger of BES and BPI, which would allow the resulting institution to overtake BCP and 
take the lead which had eluded the ES for decades. It was ultimately called off due to 
pressures, on one side, from the ES, who wanted to keep control of the resulting bank, 
and on the other, from BPI’s shareholders and management, who pressed for a governance 
model that did not allow the family to have that control. 
Either way, on one dimension, the ES were second to none: similarly to them, 
the Mellos and the Champalimauds also tried to rebuild their empires, with a 
bancassurance model at their core, but were ultimately unable to do so: by the early 
2000s, the former had sold off their bank to BCP and the latter’s financial services assets 
were divided, in different moments, between Spanish Santander, BCP and CGD. 
The group 
So, the pattern continued into the 2000s. As Salgado boasted about BES’ 
«organic growth strategy», GES continued to grow around BES towards other business 
lines, with major investments in several businesses, such as Portugal Telecom (PT) – the 
major TMT group in Portugal, privatised during the 1990s – but also hotels, real estate, 
transport, construction and development, among others. It also sought to expand 
internationally, with investments in the United States, its overseas investment banking 
arms and, particularly, in one place: by 2002 it had transformed its blooming banking 
business in Angola – which, with the end of the civil war, was becoming a leading 
emerging economy – into a full-grown retail bank, Banco Espírito Santo Angola (BESA), 
the first European bank to be awarded a banking license in post-colonial Angola. The 
group was involved also in other businesses in Angola, which remained in ESCOM, the 
local group holding, 33% owned by its native CEO. 
In any case, BES sat comfortably in third place throughout the 2000s, as a failed 
hostile takeover bid by BCP over BPI in 2005, and the ensuing drama, hindered the ability 
of either to grow. But the sprawl of GES was not devoid of hiccups. In 2002, BES 
departed with its partner of many years, PWC, opting instead for KPMG as their auditors. 
The word on the street was that PWC was under pressure to hide problems at the top 
holdings, namely the leverage of ESI and ES, but nothing ever came to light, apart from 
minor issues regarding the book values of PT assets. 
Economic and financial crisis 
The major Portuguese banks managed rather well through the market turmoil of 
the 2007-8 global financial crisis, for four main reasons. First, curiously, the Portuguese 
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economy had in 2007 registered 7-year record growth, which only slowed down slightly 
in 2008 after the Lehman bankruptcy. Second, they had little exposure to the complex 
credit products affected by the subprime crisis in the USA. Third, in line with European 
guidance, the Portuguese authorities supported the banking system with a €20bi state 
guarantee programme, to minimize liquidity issues arising from market tightening, and a 
€4bi recapitalization programme. This comprehensive response was also intended to 
contain any shockwaves from the November 2008 nationalisation of Banco Português de 
Negócios, a smaller lender that had failed dramatically amidst an accounting fraud 
scandal, mostly unrelated to the global crisis. In any case, all in all, banks’ financials were 
not particularly hit (Exhibit 3). During 2009, things continued to run more or less 
smoothly, despite a slight rise in non-performing loans, due to some windfall from export-
based firms suffering from lowered external demand.  
In September 2009, a shift in corporate structure (Exhibit 4) took place with the 
creation of Rioforte, a new holding that would absorb most of the non-financial assets, 
replacing ES Resources. Backed by loans from friendly institutional investors, but still 
wholly owned by ESI, the idea was to open the way to bringing fresh capital into GES’ 
increasingly fragile non-financial subsidiaries, who took a much greater toll during the 
crisis than the bank itself. 
In any case, a turn for the worse would come the following year. The EU/IMF 
bailout of Greece in May 2010 marked the beginning of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Portugal was out in the twin-deficit cold: its government was running a massive 
deficit and the country’s external position was very poor and still worsening. Already hit 
by faltering external demand from struggling European trade peers, strong austerity 
measures worsened even further the economic outlook. As sovereign spreads and CDSs 
spiked (Exhibit 5), banks all but lost access to financial markets, becoming increasingly 
dependent on ECB funding. The Irish government also had to be bailed out in November, 
after doubling its public debt ratio in a year following a series of rescues amidst a very 
serious banking crisis. 
The shift in external investor sentiment towards “peripheral” countries seemed 
to be structural, and as sovereign yields stayed high, after much political resistance, in 
May 2011 it was Portugal’s turn, entering a 3-year “adjustment programme”, in return for 
a €78bn bailout from a so-called “troika” of lenders (IMF, ECB and the EU). 
Despite its relative easiness through the early stage of the crisis, as was the case 
of the economy in general, the Portuguese banking system was highly leveraged at the 
time, with high loan-to-deposit ratios (Exhibit 6). A section of the measures in the 
“programme” targeted banks, forcing them to deleverage and, in some cases, also improve 
solvency indicators, in accordance with a pre-defined calendar. At the same time, the road 
to Basel III, and more stringent capital requirements, was paved. Accounting for this, 
€12bi of the bailout money was earmarked for bank recapitalisation operations. Sooner 
or later, most banks would surely need it. 
And so they did: on the morning of June 4th 2012, the government announced it 
would be providing BPI with €1.2bi of fresh capital, BCP with €3bi and even CGD with 
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€1.7bi, mostly through CoCos3. Of the four largest banks, only BES avoided state aid. 
In fact, BES had undertaken a €1bi rights issue scarce months before, allowing 
it to up its Core Tier One (CTI) ratio to a level close to 11%, above the minimum 10% 
BdP ruled Portuguese banks should reach by the end of 2012 (Exhibit 7). Market 
conditions were not exactly favourable, for which reason the new shares would be issued 
at a 41.6% discount against the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP). Even so, it was not an 
easy sell, but Salgado’s team was determined to succeed, meeting over 150 potential 
buyers in a Europe-wide roadshow. In many of the meetings, Salgado himself would pitch 
to investors. As was so often the case, he took business in his own hands.  
Ricardo Salgado, the ugly? 
“I was among the first to arrive at the bank, and the last to leave. (...) I spent 
70% of my weekends at work, to the great sacrifice of my family” 
– Ricardo Salgadoiv 
Salgado was, by then, a modern workaholic. He would typically arrive at 
Avenida da Liberdade before 8 a.m. and leave around ten. Such long hours were not for 
show: over the years, his control and power over not only the bank, but all the branches 
of GES, became greater and greater. He was not only the CEO of BES: he chaired and/or 
was executive head at many of its subsidiaries. At BES, he also was the head of the credit 
committee, the ALCO, and, within the executive committee, he was responsible for the 
accounting department and investor relations. Outside, he was also executive chairman at 
ESFG4, and board member at ESI and other group entities. 
Moreover, the 25-strong board of directors at BES was chaired by Alberto de 
Oliveira Pinto, a former executive chief at CGD, born in 1932, and at ESI, the chairman 
was still the same as back in 1991: Ricciardi, currently 96 years old. At the helm of 
Rioforte was Manuel Fernando, the first son of Manuel Ricardo who was 14 years 
younger than his cousin Salgado, and his underling at the BES executive committee. 
Banking Union and Asset Quality Review 
“We’re on the path to Banking Union, and there’ll be no room there for family 
banking groups” 
– Ricardo Salgadov 
The events of 2008 highlighted how problems in large banks can easily trigger 
market turmoil and systemic troubles. In particular, when issues appeared around Europe 
after the financial crisis mutated into a sovereign debt crisis, two things became clear: 
                                                 
3 Contingent convertible bonds. The use of this instrument (a type of debt instrument which converts into 
equity in “bad times”, in the terms defined by some triggers) became widespread from 2012 in recapitalisation 
operations with public funds, as it can be counted as loss-absorbing capital without nationalising banks. 
4 BES’ direct parent holding. Through BESPAR (a vehicle which harboured the stakes of the ES and CA in 
BES), it was considered to control the bank, and was the reference entity under BdP supervision (BES was its controlled 
subsidiary) and subject to prudential capital ratio rules. In May 2014, BESPAR was extinct – CA and ESFG owned 
stakes directly in BES instead – and the BdP supervision perimeter was thus restricted to BES. 
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that the strong link, or “vicious circle”, between banks and sovereigns in Europe left its 
economy exposed to very strong headwinds in the case of a financial crisis, and that there 
were no rules or institutions to deal with cross-border banking problems.5  
So, at a European Council summit in June 2012, European leaders decided to 
build a “Banking Union”. This would be based on three “pillars”: a “single rulebook”, 
meaning a unified legal framework for capital requirements, deposit guarantee schemes 
and other aspects throughout the EU; a “single resolution mechanism” (SRM), whereby 
the legal framework to address bank failures is the same across member states, and a 
European fund is created to provide capital to distressed “systemic”, cross-border banks 
and a “single supervisory mechanism” (SSM), where bank regulation is centralised in the 
ECB, who supervises major banks directly, only delegating to national central banks for 
smaller institutions. 
After many negotiation rounds and legal groundwork, the so-called SSM 
Regulationvi was released, announcing the ECB would «carry out a comprehensive 
assessment, including a balance-sheet assessment» of all major banks, in liaison with the 
national central banks, before taking over their supervision on November 4th 2014. This 
would become known as the Asset Quality Review (AQR). 
Discreetly, in preparation for and as part of the AQR, during 2013, BdP began 
to investigate possible issues hidden away in satellite companies’ balance sheets which 
could materially affect that of BES. These probes were already taking place due to a series 
of activities that stemmed from financial sector measures agreed with the “troika”, 
namely, in a programme named ETRICC26, with the help of auditors PwC. 
“Ring-fencing” around the tip of the iceberg 
“When (…) I was told [ESI’s debt] was €6bi, I almost died. I had no idea.” 
– Ricardo Salgadovii 
In late September 2013, BdP requested a full audit report on ESI. Preliminary 
data was made available on November 26th 2013: its Q32013 liabilities were in fact about 
€1.5bn higher than recorded initially. It would soon surface that there was unrecorded 
debt and that said liabilities had been underestimated since at least 2008, but this was the 
first time BdP had any indication of such issues. 
BdP considered this to cast doubt, to some extent, over any and all exposures of 
ESFG and BES to the non-financial side of the group, and sought to begin a “ring-
fencing” strategy, i.e. to immunize BES and its customers from any group assets. Soon, 
it would surface that ESI and other subsidiaries’ debt seemed to be everywhere, not only 
on BES and ESFG’s balance sheets, but also held by customers, sold through BES’ retail 
channels. In a letter to the board at ESFG, led by Salgado, BdP requested that if a host of 
measures was not taken within a month, they would have to record a large impairment on 
                                                 
5 Belgian bank Dexia, for example, failed mostly due to taking huge losses on its holdings of Greek sovereign 
debt, in the 2011 “haircut” credit event they suffered. 
6 Exercício Transversal de Revisão da Imparidade da Carteira de Crédito, i.e. Comprehensive review of 
credit book impairments. BdP, in September 2013, began ETRICC2, where it sought to individually audit a sample of 
major credit clients of major banks, reviewing their business plans and accounts. 
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their exposure to ESI, asking for their auditors, KPMG, to provide an estimate for that 
impairment. By then, it had also surfaced that there had been sales of ESI and RioForte 
debt (commercial paper) sold through BES’ retail channels, though the amounts were not 
clear. 
In January, a more complete version of the audit review was sent by KPMG to 
BdP. It turned out not only there was unrecorded debt, but assets were also grossly 
overvalued (Exhibit 8): as a result, instead of the originally recorded positive €136m, ESI 
had negative equity of €2.4bn. The report also detailed that of ESI’s €6.3bn debt7, €4.9bn 
was held by BES and subsidiaries’ customers. Another €1bn was owed to ES Financière 
and ES Panama (ESFG subsidiaries). It would later surface that most of ES Panama’ 
assets were group entities’ notes and bonds, and that it was mostly funded by BES. None 
of this information was made public at the time. Additionally Rioforte also had about 
€3.1bn in debt, with a part also held by BES clients. 
The board did not comply with the measures requested in December, recording 
a €700m impairment in its ESFG8 2013Q4 accounts, an amount determined by KPMG in 
February. The resulting loss meant ESFG was then below the regulatory Core Tier 1 
minimum (10% + 50 bp as a “buffer” to account for possible write-downs with the 
completion of the AQR). BdP ordered the board to increase ESFG’s solvency levels and 
that a series of corporate structure changes were to be undertaken. Among these, was a 
curious ruling: that all non-financial companies must stop bearing the “Espírito Santo” 
name. Other measures were not fulfilled, with the pressure by BdP mounting. None of 
this was public at the time, except for some vague rumours. There were only slight 
indications that the problems in group holdings might be significant: notably, a family 
feud – in November, José Maria Ricciardi, CEO of BES’ investment bank (BESI) and a 
board member at BES, challenged his cousin’s leadership claiming to have «lost trust» in 
his management, due not only to the shady connections between BES and GES but also, 
among other things, to a €14m «gift» received by Salgado from a customer, a construction 
and development tycoon, related to past business in Angola (which was forbidden by 
bank policy). An additional source of speculation was a Wall Street Journal feature in 
Decemberviii, regarding a self-financing scheme during 2012 and 2013, where “low-risk” 
mutual funds managed by BES’ asset management arm and marketed to customers, were 
at a certain stage, composed in more than 80% by GES debt – those positions had since 
been wound down, in light of new regulations. 
Slightly later, in March, with more and more news starting to trickle down, some 
customers try to withdraw investments in ESI and Rioforte funds, finding their requests 
denied. Meanwhile, customers’ holdings of GES debt were quickly wound down, but at 
a cost for BES, which would later become clear. 
  
                                                 
7 This considers not only ESI but also an additional €0.8bn owed by small subsidiaries, such as ES Irmãos, 
the remainder of ES Resources (which was being wound down at the time), and others. 
8 The provision was only recorded at the ESFG level because this entity issued a guarantee against the risky 




Meanwhile, problems which had already begun to surface in Angola, had, during 
2013, become worse. BESA was a highly leveraged bank, with a LTD ratio of about 
220%. It had credit assets of about €5.7bn, of which €3.5bn were funded by loans from 
its parent, which had grown significantly over the preceding few years. A year earlier, in 
2012, Álvaro Sobrinho, the long-time Angolan BES employee who was chosen to lead 
BESA from its foundation, was replaced as CEO, “moved” to chairman, and then 
dismissed in the bank’s 2013 shareholders’ meeting, which preceded a USD 500m rights 
issue. It had surfaced that there had been many problems with the credit function – 
Sobrinho had named his sister-in-law as chair of the credit committee – including loans 
made to unknown parties, loans whose documentation had been lost and even loans 
approved directly by the CEO to firms owned by himself. This had gone, until then, 
largely unbeknownst to BES headquarters9. This information would also not become 
public until much later. BESA was audited by KPMG’s Angolan office. 
Salgado, sometime after said shareholders meeting, met with the Angolan 
President, who subsequently issued a two-page decree serving as a state guarantee against 
USD 5.7bn (€4.2bn at the time – about 70%) of BESA’s loan book. 
On 14th January 2014, a Goldman Sachs research note sets a 12-month target of 
€1.55 (28% up) for BES stock, with “improving margins in Angola” as a key driver. 
2014 rights issue 
“Of the ten capital increases10 we have done since the reprivatisation [of 
BES], this was the most successful” 
– Ricardo Salgadoix 
On February 13th, at the press conference in which BES’ 2014 annual report was 
presented, Salgado mentioned a capital increase was a possibility in the near future, while 
rejecting resorting to the €6bn of “Troika” funds still available to banks: “We have been 
nationalised once, in 1975, and we would not like to go through that again”, he saidx. BES 
had recorded a €0.5bn loss, and had a slight capital shortfall according to Basel III rules 
(in the phasing-in arrangement valid at the time11). Moreover, not only was the AQR 
coming close to its conclusion, but there were stress tests coming soon, also as part of the 
Banking Union process, for which reason BdP required the major banks to have a certain 
additional “buffer” to accommodate any unforeseen losses. 
So, on 15th May, BES announced a €1.045bn rights issue, at a subscription price 
of €0.65. While its approval by the authorities suggested that any problems were more or 
less contained, there were still major causes for concern: the 375-page prospectus was 
                                                 
9 A large portion of Angolan loans was not recorded in the BES loan book according to the same internal 
ratings system as all the others, having to rely on aggregate information provided by BESA management.  
10 By then, BES’ equity capital was composed of 4018m shares. 
11 The Basel III agreements (and the CRD III/CRD IV European implementations thereof foresee a “phasing-
in” stage (up to 2019) where its various stipulations enter gradually into force: minimum solvency levels increase in 
small increments every year, and the same is true for the stringency of capital instrument eligibility and deductions 
rules. In Portugal, the former were anticipated by BdP; the latter are being phased-in more gradually. 
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only approved by CMVM12 after many versions were submitted, insisting that 
information on every possible risk was included. Significantly, the prospectus was the 
first document where the bank publicly disclosed the existence of accounting issues and 
a very poor financial situation in general at ESI (Exhibit 9). 
The press jumped on this information, and in the ensuing days rumours about 
the issues at ESI grew. Salgado gave an interview a week later, trying to ensure investors 
that the problems in the non-financial firms were very serious but constrained, and would 
not affect BES. BES’ shares tumbled more than 20% after the issue was announced, but 
recovered partially over the ensuing couple of weeks. (Exhibit 10) 
Indeed, supported by an impressive underwriter syndicate (Exhibit 11), the offer 
was very successful, attracting new investors. As in 2012, Salgado himself took to the 
road, but unlike 2012, most shareholders took significant dilution (Exhibit 12). 
Downfall: chain of events 
By June 9th, the rights issue had been all but fully subscribed. Over the next few 
days, though, reports begin to surface on governance changes to come at BES. BdP had 
begun to pressure Salgado’s team intensively. In this context, shares continue to fall. 
Sometime during this week Salgado meets with the government and, already under 
significant stress, requests a state loan for GES, which is denied. Weeks before, he had 
already asked for the government’s blessing for a loan to GES by a syndicate led by CGD 
and BCP, which was also denied.  Government sources would over the next few weeks 
repeatedly deny the possibility of direct public funding for BES, both in public and in 
private discussions with BdP. On the 13th, Machado da Cruz, a financial officer at ESI, 
who had been blamed by Salgado for the accounting issues, claims in an interview that 
he was aware that there had been several operations kept off the balance sheet. A week 
later, on the 20th, Salgado announces the intention to step down. Speculation grows on 
the problems at ESI, as reports intensify mentioning BdP pressure for any board members 
and directors related to the family to leave. 
On July 3rd, ESFG announces that its exposure to GES entities had increased by 
more than two-thirds, to €2.4bn, over the previous few months, in order «to support the 
reimbursement of GES group commercial paper held by retail clients»xi. A couple of days 
later, a new fully independent executive committee is announced by the BES board: Vítor 
Bento, a former BdP director and CEO of SIBS13, is named as CEO. 
10th July is a key date: In the morning, ESFG suspends its own securities’ trading 
due to overwhelming financial stress at ESI, amid reports of it failing payments on 
commercial paper to private banking customers in Switzerland and more detailed 
information on the irregularities at ESI and BESA. BES dropped 17% before also being 
removed from trading. Shares fell all over Europe in a minor sell-off which analysts 
attributed to market nervousness due to the situation at BES. At night, BES issued a 
                                                 
12 CMVM stands for Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, i.e. the Portuguese Securities Market 
Commission, comparable to e.g. the American Securities and Exchange Commission. 
13 SIBS is a joint-venture responsible for managing the interbank ATM and card payment system 
infrastructure (“Multibanco”) in Portugal. 
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statement with details on its exposures to group entities. (Exhibit 13) 
As the market and news flow pressure did not respite, trying to restore 
confidence, on Sunday 13th, BdP forces the exit of Salgado and Morais Pires. Bento, his 
deputy and his CFO enter the field (the change was only meant to take place at a 
shareholders’ meeting on 31st July), but other board and executive committee members 
remained in place. On 18th and 22nd, ESI and Rioforte, respectively, file for creditor 
protection. The latter had failed to repay a batch of almost €900m of short-term debt held 
by PT14. Curiously, on the 23rd, shares climb over 15% as Goldman Sachs and a US hedge 
fund increase their holdings of BES shares from marginal to over 2% of its equity, even 
though it was clear by then that a new capital increase would be needed at the soonest. 
Soon, on Friday, 25th, it was ESFG’s turn to file for creditor protection, but an even worse 
development had taken place early in the previous day’s morning: Salgado was detained 
by police at home, for questioning in an unrelated money laundering and tax fraud 
investigation. He was later released on bail of €3m. Meanwhile, BES’ Q2 results’ 
presentation, due that day, was postponed. Shares fell 8%. 
2014Q2 results 
On Monday, 28th July, reports surface that losses at BES might be above 
expected, in the €3bn range. KPMG provides the final Q2 data to BdP in advance, 
indicating capital ratios were below requirements. BdP gives BES a 48-hour deadline to 
show proof that it can raise capital to compensate for the shortfall. 
On Wednesday night, BES finally posts Q2 results: a loss of €3.58bn, mostly 
due to impairments on GES and BESA exposures, losses on own bonds repurchase and 
SPE/SPV operations (Exhibit 14). Bento announces a forthcoming capital increase. BdP, 
at this point, suspends board members responsible for risk, audit and compliance, issuing 
a statement about “recently discovered (…) gravely damaging management practises in 
the past few weeks” and replaces the bank’s audit committee (Exhibit 15). 
 Unbeknownst to the public for the time being, adding to the issues disclosed in 
the Q2 report which were more or less foreseen in the July 10th communication, already 
during July BES had repurchased €1.5bn of its own debt instruments from customers, in 
heavy loss-making operations: these bonds, having originally been issued and sold to 
customers at a discount, were now being bought back at fair value (and above market 
value).15 Similar operations had already taken place during the preceding months, 
accounting for a part of the provisions in Q2 results). Some deposits (close to €2bn, 
especially from Spain) also fled, as customers grew wary with all the speculation. Other 
operations also infected BES further, such as two “comfort letters” (guarantees) sent to 
Venezuelan state oil funds in the end of June regarding €260m of ESI debt they held. 
                                                 
14 The investment accounted for over 50% of PT’s current assets (excluding accounts receivable, as per its 
Q22014 report). Its chairman was Henrique Granadeiro, a childhood friend of the ES. He resigned after these events. 
15 Note that these were zero-coupon bonds with very high maturities (40 years) – thus particularly difficult 
to accurately value – which had been placed through Eurofin, a small Luxembourg securities trading firm led by a 
former employee of GES, Alexandre Cadosch. The repurchased bonds were purportedly meant to be traded for assets 
held by other clients in Switzerland and Luxembourg, specifically, preference shares of SPVs that financed GES entities 
such as ESI. 
14 
 
All in all, BES had leaked during July about €3.35bn. By then, far exceeding its 
collateral pool, necessary for repo operations with the ECB, it had been forced to resort 
to the ELA16 lifeline to the tune of €3.5bn. That night, the ECB executive committee calls 
BdP, warning that BES would lose counterparty status17 the next day. This meant a legal 
obligation to immediately return any ECB funds loaned to the bank, regardless of their 
maturity – by then a total of €10bn, up from €8.5bn on June 30th. BdP managed to 
negotiate a slight delay – in a ECB Council conference call, at noon the next day, it was 
decided that that harsh measure would only take place the following Monday, but BES’ 
fate was, by then, already settled. 
The resolution 
In fact, BdP had started making preparations, days before, for an eventual 
extreme solution. Having in the previous days hired a law firm, to analyse all legislation 
on bank resolution, and exchanged contacts with the European Competition Authority, 
who must authorise any state aid to private firms in member states, on Thursday night, 
after the call from the ECB, the resolution was all but decided. Right after the Council, 
BdP called the government, letting them know of the decision, but not CMVM. Only 
later, at 3.12pm, did BdP’s Governor call CMVM’s head, letting him know there was 
“material information due to be released soon”. Shares finally hit rock bottom (€0.101) 
at 3.34 pm, before finally being suspended 15 minutes later, at €0.12. On that very same 
day, changes to the banking legal framework, notably, related to some details with respect 
to the resolution of banks, were enacted by the government. On Saturday night, a political 
commentator described the resolution model chosen on his weekly TV show. 
*** 
Before and during the 2007-8 financial crisis, bank failures would be solved in 
one of two ways. Most commonly, banks were “bailed out” i.e. governments would either 
provide substantial loans or outright buy into banks and provide them with fresh capital. 
In either case, banks’ creditors would not face any losses and existing shareholders might, 
at worst, suffer short-term losses as the bank’s prospects, and therefore share price, 
deteriorate. The perceived only alternative was to let them fail and enter bankruptcy as a 
normal company, which in the case of banks with “systemic importance” can have 
unpredictably problematic effects on the financial system and the economy, of which the 
failure of Lehman Brothers was an unfortunately acute example. 
A strong idea behind the reforms in Europe was basically to reframe the way 
bank failures are handled around the concepts of resolution and bail-in. Indeed, the 
resolution measures applied in the case of BES were only effectively possible due to a 
newly implemented legal framework, put in place as a stepping stone towards the full 
implementation of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)xii. From 1st 
January 2016, when BRRD must be implemented in Member States, shareholders, all 
bondholders and even unsecured depositors must bear losses before public funds may be 
                                                 
16 Emergency Liquidity Assistance is defined by the ECB as «the provision by a Eurosystem national central 
banks of (…) central bank money (…) to solvent [banks] facing temporary liquidity problems, without such operation 
being part of the single monetary policy». This is generally used when banks run out of eligible collateral. 
17 License to engage in monetary policy operations (repos and longer-term operations) 
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used. Until then, and since 1st August 2013, a new version of the so-called Banking 
Communicationxiii applies, requiring some subordinated debt and all of the equity to be 
bailed-in in order for public rescue funding to be allowed under state aid rules. 
So was the case of BES. Junior bondholders and shareholders (Exhibit 16) – 
including those who had just increased their position in the bank, in the May rights issue 
– were, for the time being, left with nothing but rights to receive some of the proceeds 
after BES’ liquidation proceedings. These, in turn, relate only to those assets deemed 
“toxic” in its balance sheet (Exhibit 17). Among the biggest losers were, obviously, 
qualified shareholders: Crédit Agricole, for instance, had to cope with a €0.7bn write-off: 
97.5% of its Q2 “would-be” profits.  
Most of BES’ sound assets were removed and placed into NB, the “bridge bank”, 
wholly owned by the Portuguese resolution fund18 (RF), who provided it with €4.9bn in 
capital, and is liable for all deposits and senior bonds, which were similarly moved. 
Theoretically, RFs work as insurance systems, funded by regular yearly contributions of 
all of the country’s banks. In practise, however, the Portuguese one had little capital of 
its own, as it was only created in 2012. The operation was in fact mostly funded by the 
government, who provided a loan to the fund. The complete financing structure was 
negotiated between the government and other banks during August, only being decided 
by the end of the month (Exhibit 18). 
NB is to be sold, with the proceeds going to RF, its 100% owner. If these are 
insufficient to repay the state loan, other banks would theoretically be liable to repay any 
shortfall to the government, even if the legal and institutional mechanisms through which 
that might be enforced remain unclear. In principle, this would be done through some 
kind of «extraordinary contribution» to the fund, which would be required from 
participating banks. However, BdP has since admitted that the exact terms would only be 
defined at the time of a prospective sale, depending on the amount of the shortfall. 
                                                 
18 In the preceding years with the progressive implementation of new bank resolution rules, “resolution funds” 





Exhibit 1. Selected portions of the Espírito Santo family tree 
 
Sources: BES; Geneall; “O Último Banqueiro” (See endnote i); Press sources 
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Exhibit 2. Market shares of Portuguese banking sector, 1998(before?)-2014 
 
Sources: Company data/CMVM; Bureau Van Dijk (Bankscope); Banco de Portugal; Own calculations 
Exhibit 3. Portuguese domestic banks consolidated headline financials, 2007-14 
 
Note: N/A = not available. 
Source: Banco de Portugal 

















BES BPI BCP CGD Santander Totta
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Selected income statement indicators
Net interest income 3,983 4,970 6,200 6,012 5,969 7,013 6,504
Operating costs 5,314 5,554 5,844 5,921 5,721 5,833 5,647
Impairments 4,985 5,921 5,818 2,878 2,931 3,592 1,419
Net income -2,733 -1,235 -1,516 917 452 -220 2,511
Selected balance sheet indicators
Available for sale financial assets 55,206 51,189 44,448 46,616 35,386 21,505 22,640
Gross credit to clients 233,066 248,483 246,496 261,992 270,345 268,200 242,513
Of which: Overdue 16,295 15,179 12,137 9,603 8,915 5,632 4,022
Liabilities to central banks 51,126 56,179 50,723 49,157 19,419 14,407 5,731
Liabilities to other banks 46,883 61,247 74,602 81,125 74,316 74,303 72,362
Deposits and other liabilities to clients 253,164 251,027 244,431 230,558 218,478 217,870 195,604
Debt securities issued 41,184 56,600 75,029 89,061 116,807 94,219 97,333
Solvency indicators
Regulatory capital ratio 11.9% 11.3% 8.6% 8.3% 7.8% 6.6% 7.0%
Core Tier I (BIS II) ratio 12.3% 11.5% 8.7% 7.4% N/A N/A N/A
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Exhibit 4. Simplified GES/BES corporate structure, 2014  
 
Note: ”Conselho Superior” members all held similar stakes in ES Control, close to but under 20%; except for the case 
of Manuel Fernando, who represents his mother’s stake, Maria do Carmo Moniz Galvão ES (in fact the largest 
shareholder with 19.4%).  
Sources: BES; ESFG; BPI Equity Research; Press sources 
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Exhibit 6. Loan-to-deposit ratio, Portuguese domestic banks vs. BES, 2009-13 
 




Exhibit 7. BES selected financial indicators, 2009-14 
 
*Total assets = Net Assets + Asset Management + Other off-balance sheet assets + Securitised Credit  
** Values refer to Common Equity Tier I (CETI) (“phased-in” BIS III) in 2014, Core Tier I (CTI) (BIS II) before 
*** Set in Tier I terms until 2010; CTI until 2013; CETI 2014 
**** Loans on which a payment is overdue for more than 90 days 
Note: The “fully loaded” BIS III CETI ratio was, as of 31.03.2014, 8% and would be 9.6% post-2014 capital increase. 
As of 30.06.2014, it was 4.1%. 
Values in millions EUR. Source: BES (Prospectus rights issue 2014; Annual report 2011); BPI Equity Research 
Exhibit 8. ESI 2013Q3 headline financials from 
KPMG Jan14 special report 
 
Values in millions EUR. 
Note: ESI was not independently audited. The 
special report by KPMG was prepared at the request 
of BdP for ETRICC2. Source: KPMG/”Expresso”  
 Exhibit 9. Selected pages of 2014 rights issue prospectus 
Source: BES 
30-06-2014 31-03-2014 31-12-2013 31-12-2012 31-12-2011 31-12-2010 31-12-2009
Key balance sheet indicators
Total assets* 93,419 96,150 93,342 97,765 98,589 105,540 105,917
Net assets 80,216 82,817 80,608 83,691 80,237 83,655 81,702
Gross credit to clients 51,281 51,001 49,722 50,399 51,211 55,713 50,531
Deposits 35,932 36,242 36,831 34,540 34,206 30,819 25,447
Debt securities issued 11,476 12,666 11,920 15,424 18,452 24,110 33,101
Solvency indicators
Risk-weighted assets 60,169 62,268 57,332 61,681 65,385 65,097 68,802
CETI/CTI capital** 3036 6079 6084 6471 6020 5416 5232
(Total equity) 4244 7017 7049 7733 6192 6859 6344
CETI/CTI ratio** 5.0% 9.8% 10.6% 10.5% 9.2% 7.9% 8.0%
Tier I ratio 5.0% 9.8% 10.4% 10.4% 9.4% 8.8% 8.3%
Regulatory minimum*** 7.0% 7.0% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 8.0% 8.0%
Liquidity indicators
ECB funds (net) 7,432 8,346 5,414 6,897 8,677 3,929 -1,760
Repoable assets 21,593 23,783 20,912 22,256 18,881 10,823 5,553
LTD ratio 126% 129% 121% 137% 141% 165% 192%
Credit quality indicators
Overdue loans**** / Gross loans 6.4% 6.0% 5.7% 3.9% 2.7% 2.0% 1.6%
Credit provisions / Gross loans 10.5% 7.2% 6.8% 5.3% 4.2% 3.4% 3.1%
Cost of risk 8.3% 2.2% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 0.7% 1.1%
30-06-2014 31-03-2014 31-12-2013 31-12-2012 31-12-2011 31-12-2010 31-12-2009
Summary income statement
Net interest income 287.0 269.9 1,034.5 1,180.5 1,181.6 1,164.0 1,200.9
+ Fees and commissions 332.9 151.9 693.4 828.4 790.5 806.9 717.9
= Retail banking income 619.9 421.8 1,727.9 2,008.9 1,972.1 1,970.9 1,918.8
+ Trading and other income -356.0 154.7 172.1 569.5 -21.9 432.9 530.6
= Banking income 263.9 576.5 1,900.0 2,578.4 1,950.2 2,403.8 2,449.4
- Operating costs 594.8 286.4 1,137.0 1,149.1 1,129.2 1,123.1 1,006.1
= Net operating income -330.9 290.1 763.0 1,429.3 821.0 1,280.7 1,443.3
- Provisions 4,253.5 380.6 1,422.8 1,199.4 848.3 533.6 708.8
= Income before taxes -4,584.4 -90.5 -659.8 229.9 -27.3 747.1 734.5
- Income tax -843.5 6.1 -145.2 110.7 -31.1 43.7 109.8
- Minority interests -163.7 -7.4 2.8 23.7 112.6 146.5 53.0
= Net income -3,577.3 -89.2 -517.4 95.5 -108.8 556.9 571.7
Year-to-date
First reported Adjusted
Assets 7,823.3       5,575.7       
Liabilities 7,687.3       7,941.6       





Exhibit 10. BES.LS stock: daily open, close, maximum and minimum prices; volume traded; May-August 2014 
 
Source: Yahoo! Finance 







Exhibit 12. Syndicate of underwriters in 2014 rights issue 
 
 
Source: BES (rights issue prospectus) 
 Exhibit 13. BES qualified stakes 
 
Source: BES (Q22014 report) 
 
Exhibit 14. BES exposures to GES 2013-14 
 
* Debt issued by the aforementioned entities and held by BES 
** Debt issued by the aforementioned entities and subscribed to by BES clients 
Values in millions EUR. Source: BES (Q22014 report) 
  












ESFG (Luxembourg) 6.00% 1.38%
ESFG (Portugal) 19.05% -
Portugal Telecom 2.06% 2.09%
Crédit Agricole (France) 12.19% 10.81%
Silchester (UK) 4.70% 5.67%
BlackRock (US) 4.65% 2.00%
Capital Group (US) 4.23% 4.14%
Bradesco (Brazil) 3.91% 4.83%
Others 43.21% 33.79%
% of BES equity
10th July
30.06.2014 30.06.2014 31.03.2014 31.12.2013
Rioforte and subsidiaries 234.2 270.8 69.6 101.7
ESFG and subsidiaries 934.4 927.6 416.2 301.3
Opway, ESCOM, and others 71.2 373.4 321.5 298.2
Total (excl. insurance) 1239.8 1571.8 807.3 701.2
Tranquilidade and subsidiaries 304.6 226.2 203.8 301.1
Total 1544.4 1798 1011.1 1002.3
10th July
30.06.2014 31.03.2014 31.12.2013
Type of client Total Total Institutional Retail 
ESI and similar 766 766 511 255 762 1565
Rioforte and subsidiaries 1882 1882 1496 386 544 565
ESFG and subsidiaries 251 251 0 251 172 186
ESCOM and ES Tourism 208 208 0 208 206 206











Exhibit 15. Breakdown of special events’ effects on BES income as reported on Q22014 
 
* Impairments refer to stakes in PT (€106.1m); Aman Bank of Libya (€10.2m); Real estate funds (€85.4m) 
Values in millions EUR. Source: BES (Q22014 report) 
Exhibit 16. BES Corporate Governance tree 
 
Source: BES (Corporate Governance report 2013) 
Exhibit 17. Resolution financing structure 
 
Values in millions EUR. Source: Banco de Portugal 
Exhibit 18. Resolution liability distribution 
All liabilities and off-balance-sheet items of BES were 
transferred to Novo Banco, S.A. except: 
• All subordinated debt instruments (€1.1bn) 
• Claims (deposits, securities or other) from “related 
parties”, including: 
o Shareholders with controlling stakes i.e. ≥ 2% 
o Board members and auditors, considered 
responsible for the difficulties at BES by BdP 
o Entities meeting any of the above criteria at any 
time during the two years before the resolution 
o Family members or proxies of any persons 
meeting any of the above criteria 
• Claims and guarantees related to BES/GES entities 
(excluding those relative to BES subsidiaries 
transferred to NB) 
Note: all contracts and agreements with workers and 
external service providers were also transferred to NB. 
Source: BdP; NB; BPI Equity Research 
Exhibit 19. Resolution asset distribution 
All assets, rights and licenses of BES were transferred 
to Novo Banco, S.A. except: 
• Loan exposures to GES entities except: 
o Loans to ESFG 
o Loans to BES subsidiaries 
o Loans to Tranquilidade and 
subsidiaries 
• Equity stakes in BESA, Aman Bank (Libya), 
ES Bank (Miami) 
• €10m in cash-equivalents for liquidation 
procedure expenses (staff, legal duties, etc.) 
Note: Assets under the management (AUM) of BES 
also became managed by NB. 
Est. value of NB assets as of Aug. 4th 2014: €72,465m. 
  















Net interest income 287.0 -247.2 534.2
+ Fees and commissions 332.9 332.9
= Retail banking income 619.9 -247.2 867.1
+ Trading and other income -356.0 -9.6 -491.0 -75.4 -20.4 240.4
= Banking income 263.9 -9.6 -491.0 -247.2 -75.4 -20.4 1,107.5
- Operating costs 594.8 594.8
= Net operating income -330.9 -9.6 -491.0 -247.2 -75.4 -20.4 512.7
- Provisions 4,253.5 2,062.3 757.8 3.7 383.6 181.3 864.8
= Income before taxes -4,584.4 -2,071.9 -1,248.8 -250.9 -459.0 -201.7 -352.2
- Income tax -843.5 -339.0 -368.4 73.8 -111.0 -22.0 -76.9
- Minority interests -163.7 -143.8 -19.9
= Net income -3,577.3 -1,732.9 -880.4 -180.9 -348.0 -179.7 -255.4




The case of BES is that of the retail and commercial banking front of an 
extraordinarily intricate corporate structure, the backbone of a group which expanded 
globally and far beyond financial services, controlled by a traditional, century-old 
banking dynasty. Losses in the non-financial side of the group (known as GES) mounted 
during years, but faulty corporate governance allowed the family to use the bank’s 
resources at its own will – and ultimately expropriating the bank’s shareholders –, 
extracting cash from the bank to finance their unsustainable, unrelated businesses. The 
bank ultimately failed due to taking huge risks in GES (and in its Angolan subsidiary, 
riddled with bad credit), of which the full extent was only known, in its 2014 Q2 results, 
which revealed a large capital shortfall. Amidst mounting pressure from regulators, 
customers and the market, a liquidity crisis escalated until the bank lost access to central 
bank money and had to be resolved. 
The discussion of the case study should cover the corporate governance issues 
in both the bank and the broader group. It should also approach why it is important that 
“vanilla” banking firms are as independent as possible from other kinds of business. 
Students should also analyse the stress period leading to the bank’s ultimate failure, the 
authorities’ actions and how investors’ interests were or not protected and, finally, the 
implemented resolution model. Below are proposed possible questions for class 
discussion and their respective solution topics. 
1. What is GES and how does it relate to BES? 
GES is the generic designation of the multiple firms and holdings in which the 
family’s interests and non-financial businesses were invested. BES was, in principle, the 
retail and commercial banking front of the group, in a very complex corporate structure. 
Downstream from ESFG, the immediate parent to BES, were many subsidiaries in 
different areas (from asset management to venture capital, among others), but most 
importantly, upstream, the financial services business served as the backbone of a group 
which expanded globally in many different industries, but focusing on construction and 
development.  
The Espírito Santos did not have per se a controlling stake in the bank but exerted 
effective control over it, first and foremost due to the strategic partnership with relatively 
silent Crédit Agricole. In fact, their main stake was held through a waterfall of holdings 
with ES Control at the top. In the end, they ultimately represented only about 5-6% of 
BES’ equity. BES was strongly connected to GES in multiple, unpredictable ways: 
through ESFG, BES had a strong exposure to GES entities debt; GES debt instruments 
were extensively sold at BES counters to customers; mutual funds managed by BES had 
great exposures to GES; multiple managers and board members at BES had connections 
to GES. 
2. How was BES performing before its dramatic fall? 
While not catastrophic, BES performance was deteriorating. Its 2013 results were 
essentially a prelude to the Q22014 meltdown: a record loss of €500m mostly due to credit 
provisions, but also a steep fall in trading income. At €255m, BES was on track to perform 
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just as poorly in 2014, if one exclu des the effects of the GES/BESA tragedy – even if 
trading income was slightly up (but the trading loss in 2014 may have already been related 
to operations with GES debt), a downward trend in fees and commissions continued from 
2013. All in all, performance was fairly poor, even if one takes into account that the very 
low interest rate environment mattered to the persistence of low NII, and was an 
additional source of pressure. 
3. What finally caused the downfall of BES? 
Solvency issues arose at GES and BESA, and as plenty new information was 
uncovered on the exposures of BES to these entities, doubts began to be raised over the 
solvency of BES. Despite the success of the rights issue, liquidity problems began to 
mount in June and July: clients trying to redeem GES debt or fund units at BES, its 
subsidiaries and ESFG subsidiaries (e.g. Banque Privée Espírito Santo). Deposits, 
especially in Spain, flying as not only market, but also customer confidence suffered with 
the successive bouts of bad news. 
Any confidence left vanished with the major capital shortfall due to the losses 
announced in the Q2 results, and the liquidity crisis escalates, culminating with, most 
importantly of all, the ECB removing BES’ counterparty status on Friday (meaning that 
BES would have to redeem some €10bn of monetary policy loans the next Monday). As 
there was no immediate solution to provide additional capital, and much-needed cash, in 
a matter of days, the chain of events had evolved into a solvency crisis at the bank, leading 
to its fall and resolution. 
4. What are the main issues you identify with BES corporate governance? How 
do they affect incentives and value sharing between the main involved parties? 
The very strong linkages between the bank and GES are all revealing of relevant 
corporate governance faults at BES. The agency problems inherent to the relationship 
between shareholders and managers of public companies are well-established in academic 
literaturexiv These problems tend to be aggravated with the existence of a large, 
controlling shareholder – as is often the case of founding families, such as the Espírito 
Santo –, but a multitude  of factors contributed to yield them their power over the bank: 
the bloated size of the bank’s board of directors, the fact that the CEO (as well as multiple 
executive and non-executive board members) were family members; the chairman, 
though in principle independent, was very old (hardly the best profile to take a thorough, 
aggressive position in defending minority shareholders’ interests); that Salgado, as CEO, 
was simultaneously a manager of many group companies who owed BES directly and 
indirectly; among others. 
All in all, this was a very favourable context for the expropriation of shareholders 
by the family, who extracted money from the bank through debt – and even from its 
clients – to prop up their non-financial businesses on a regular basis, using the bank as a 
platform for the group to develop on. By lending to GES, both directly and through 
holdings, or selling GES debt to customers, the bank was financing and increasing its risk 
exposure to one of its own shareholders. This increased the incentives mismatch between 
management, GES and other shareholders, which was accentuated by the ultimately small 
size of their stake in the bank. 
Also, regulators’ job was purposefully made very difficult: the very intricate and 
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complex structure of both BES’ subsidiary universe and the upstream group made a true 
real-time assessment of the bank’s exposure to the family’s non-financial firms 
extraordinarily hard. Moreover, the fact that most of the holding companies were in 
different jurisdictions (with possibly more lax regulatory environments), as well as some 
of BES’ subsidiaries used to finance GES, made it very hard to trace back financial flows 
and assess each component’s solvency.  
5. Why did BES undertake a rights issue in 2014, just two years after the last 
one? Did it seem like a good deal with the information available? What was the 
implied discount in the offer price assuming all rights were exercised? 
As of March, the solvency level of BES, as measured by the “phasing-in” CETI 
ratio, was sufficient to comply with the regulatory minimum. However, several potential 
obstacles loomed in a near future, which would possibly consume some of that capital 
buffer or otherwise decrease BES’ regulatory ratios: as mentioned above, financial 
performance was fairly poor, with the bank running at a loss; the potential for further 
provisions, considering the trouble at GES and BESA, was high; as more stringent Basel 
III rules enter into force regarding the eligibility of CETI capital, the ratio decreases 
(hence the lower “fully loaded” ratio); the AQR and stress tests would potentially uncover 
additional necessary write-offs. 
For these reasons, a capital infusion was necessary (or would be in a near future). 
As they had done in 2012 (and 2009…), BES management sought to raise capital in the 
market. Though better than in 2012, conditions were still unfavourable for such an 
operation (hence the large discount), but unlike all the other major Portuguese banks, it 
insisted in not resorting to public recapitalisation funds. This could eventually be 
considered to have historical reasons, namely that the ES family, out of “pride” or 
“trauma” regarding the bank’s nationalisation forty years earlier, would not allow that to 
happen again. A more serious assumption, though, is that they needed to avert not only 
the possibility that state aid might entail an unprecedentedly thorough due diligence 
process on BES books and more importantly, that a state loan would come with covenants 
limiting their ability to control the bank and use it to finance GES at will. Moreover, they 
pushed the operation through sooner than later, as in a stress situation – as would later 
materialise – there is often no time for a private capital increase, leaving public funding 
as the only viable solution.  
It should be noted that this insistence was detrimental to the interests of 
shareholders – due to what they stood to lose directly from the successive rights issues, 
through dilution and underwriting fees, but also, simply, because the cost of capital of 
(new) equity was much higher than the interest rate the bank would have paid on 
government funding (likely through CoCos). 
At €0.65, the rights issue implied a 39% discount to the closing price on May 
15th (€1.06), and 32% to the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP) – ignoring underwriting 
costs: €1,045m/€0.65 = 1,607m new shares; 1,607m/4,018m = 40% additional shares; 
€1.06*(1/1.4)+€0.65*(0.4/1.4) = €0.96 = TERP; 1-(€0.96/€1.06) = 32% discount.  
This extremely low and dilutive issue price was chosen to ensure the success of 
the operation: on the one hand, to attract strong interest from new investors and 
incentivize the existing shareholders to either acquire additional shares or sell their rights; 
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on the other hand, it must have been a necessary condition to get the underwriters on 
board – they would need to be sure that the post-operation price would be significantly 
higher than the issue price (as seen by the large discount to TERP), as it actually did, 
during about one month. 
In any case, from the perspective of a new investor, with the information 
available, the rights issue would have likely appeared to be a great deal, considering the 
huge discount, and that a syndicate of many of the world’s leading investment banks made 
themselves available to purchase the new stock if necessary. There were, however, some 
bad signs, namely the fact that most existing shareholders took significant dilution and 
the extensive warnings, in the prospectus, about the potential effects of issues at GES and 
BESA– even if the extent of these was by no measure fully public at the time. 
6. How did the insolvency of GES affect BES? How did BES management 
decisions during July contribute to the bank’s debacle? 
BES’ direct holdings of ESFG and especially Rioforte debt were already indeed 
in immediate risk of default, and ultimately all had to be impaired. In addition, BdP ruled 
that, at least for retail clients, BES was liable for all its indirect exposures – provisions 
also were created for those. All this created a huge pressure on BES’ Q2 results and 
contributed to the major capital shortfall. Also, the operations made before June 30th 
(reflected in Exhibit 15) and especially afterwards, using SPV/SPEs to pull money from 
BES to Rioforte and ESI, to allow them to meet immediate obligations, as were the 
operations at ESFG subsidiaries other than BES – and BES as well –, where clients were 
allowed to redeem GES debt instruments at the bank, as well as other bond repurchases, 
completely drained the bank’s liquidity, forcing it to resort to ELA, having far exceeded 
its ability to borrow from the ECB. 
7. What was the main issue with Angola and BESA? 
While its high leverage was cause for concern, it was not necessarily a problem: 
it was merely a subsidiary of BES, and while it was desirable that the Angola business 
contributed with more deposits, the LTD ratio of BES was at a reasonable level and so as 
long as there was enough capital at the BES level, commensurate with the risks taken in 
Angola, there should not be a problem. The aggressive position at BESA might have been 
justified for competitive reasons, or for an optimistic view of growth prospects in an 
emerging market. 
Having said that, adequate information on credit assets is key for the successful 
management of any banking firm: on the one hand, the predictability of its cash flows is 
essential for adequate asset-liability management to be possible, and on the other hand, 
precise information on risk is necessary for the right amount of capital to be kept against 
those assets: neither more – affecting profitability – nor less – jeopardising solvency – 
than necessary. 
The issue, then, was the existence of huge risks in BESA’s loan book which had 
gone unnoticed – including a considerable sum, over €3bn, of probably unrecoverable 
loans – and, therefore, their write-off entailed a capital shortfall, as would become clear 
in BES’ 2014Q2 results. That any loans were extended without adequate information on 
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the risks involved (and even to whom they were extended) would not have been possible 
without the failure of multiple elements in the BES/BESA corporate governance.  
8. What checks and balances were in place to protect investors’ interests? Could 
they have done so better? 
Internally, BES’ corporate governance model had structures that theoretically 
were in place to control the executive committee’s actions, namely: independent board 
members; audit committee in the board; compliance and risk functions; among others. 
While some of the problems may only have occurred in the context of illegal, deceptive 
actions, which compliance and risk officers may not have been expected to be able to 
uncover on their own, issues such as the large-scale, disproportionate sale of GES debt 
instruments or loss-making buybacks thereof should have raised flags in BES internal 
control mechanisms. 
There are many external observers who, by following and researching the bank’s 
activity, might exert limited pressure and control over the management, such as rating 
agencies, equity research analysts, the press, academia, and so on – even if largely limited 
to public information. However, two main external entities are essential to controlling the 
bank’ management and protect investors’ interests: auditors and supervisors. 
Issues such as hidden exposures of BES and ESFG to GES and the worthlessness 
of some €3bn of credit at BESA probably should have been detected and brought to light 
much sooner by the auditors. While assessing the auditors’ performance is beyond the 
scope of this case, several problems can be generally identified in association with the 
auditor’s important role. While this role is precisely to reduce the agency costs arising 
from the conflict of interest between management and (in this case, non-controlling) 
shareholders, another conflict may also arise in the relationship between the auditor and 
its customer.  
Auditors provide an assurance that the firm’s financial statements are true, 
precise and complete, which benefits shareholders and also other stakeholders, such as 
creditors, depositors and even the market in general – a “public good” of sorts –, while 
their fees are paid for by the firm – a cost for shareholders in general. However, choosing 
(and dismissing) the auditor is largely at the management’s discretion, even if often 
auditors must be approved by a shareholder majority. Obviously, this conflict seems 
particularly strong in the case of BES, where the incentives of the management (and 
controlling shareholder) are particularly misaligned with those of the other shareholders. 
Moreover, KPMG was the auditor of many if not all of ESFG and BES subsidiaries, 
accentuating the relative importance of the group as a revenue stream for the firm. The 
case of BESA is particularly remarkable how such a large amount of poorly accounted 
for credit could have gone unnoticed. 
The case of BES also raises questions about the role of supervisors. First, BdP 
in its role as prudential regulator: could it have insisted that more information was 
provided on BES’ exposures to GES earlier? Could it have forced changes in BES’ faulty 
corporate governance earlier? Did it monitor closely enough (within its powers) the 
functioning of BES existing structures, such as the audit committees, accounting, risk and 
other functions? Second, BdP in its role as behavioural supervisor: Were sales practises 
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at BES, namely placing GES debt with clients, legal and adequately monitored? Was all 
information was provided to customers buying securities of a separate but related party 
to the bank? Third, the role of CMVM, the market regulator: Were the warnings in the 
2014 rights issue prospectus “too little, too late”? Within its powers, could it have 
prevented the rights issue from being completed, at least unless even more information 
was provided in the prospectus? Should it have suspended trading on BES shares earlier?  
Also note that this case highlights the importance of good coordination between 
the banking supervisor and the market regulator (see also question 14). For example, with 
better cooperation, CMVM might have suspended trading sooner if it had known earlier 
about the resolution, and more might have been done, during the critical months of June 
of July, to get all the relevant information out at the same time, rather than a successive 
collection of bad news dripping through, fostering speculation and undermining market 
confidence. 
9. What different solutions were available to the authorities on the last week of 
July 2014? Why might have this resolution model been chosen? 
Once BES’ capital was below the regulatory minimum, from a theoretical 
standpoint BdP had four options; a) a new private capital increase, b) a government-
funded capital increase and c) full liquidation. d) a resolution measure. 
a) Market confidence was shattered. Moreover, the size of the shortfall, made it 
very hard to gather enough investor interest at the required scale. In any case, BES needed 
an immediate cash infusion, and a new rights issue would take at least a couple of months. 
b) Similar to d), without splitting the bank. The same bail-in measures would 
necessarily be applied. Regarding the losses arising from toxic/uncertain assets, on a good 
scenario, shareholders/junior creditors would lose less; on a bad scenario, the same, and 
government would likely be called upon to provide additional capital. Would require 
significant political backing which might not be available. 
c) Due to the size of the bank would severely affect the financial system and 
possibly the greater economy, therefore was not viable. 
d) a) and c) were seemingly impossible from a practical point of view. D) seems 
more favourable than b) to the interests of government, depositors and senior 
bondholders, as it contains the problems that may arise from the toxic assets that remain 
in “bad bank”-BES, not allowing as yet unknown further impairments to contaminate the 
bank (NB)19. For the “bailed-in” parties, this solution is worse. 
10. Was the resolution of BES a bail-out or a bail-in? How would your answer 
differ if the resolution fund was fully capitalised? 
The measures adopted are particularly interesting as they do not necessarily fit the 
description of either a typical bail-out or a fully-fledged bail-in resolution. There is a bail-
out component, as public money was used, even if the banking system is, via RF, 
theoretically liable to repay the amount to the state, even if the legal-institutional 
                                                 
19 It should be noted however that this might not be the case if an interested party (e.g. a vulture 
fund holding BES subordinated debt) is able to successfully challenge BdP’s resolution decision (or a part 
of it) in court. In the case of BESI, which was separated from NB and already sold to a Chinese group, the 
sale contract stipulates that any costs arising from litigation regarding the resolution will impend on BdP/the 
government, with the bank being sold “litigation-free”. This will likely also be the case when NB is resold. 
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mechanisms through which that can be enforced remain somewhat unclear. At the same 
time, shareholders and junior creditors bear losses – are “bailed-in” – even if the bail-in 
is only partial, as other uninsured creditors and depositors were spared. If the resolution 
fund had enough available own resources (i.e. contributions from banks), there would be 
no bail-out component, as the funds used for the recap would not originate in general 
taxes (despite technically being considered public funds, as the resolution fund is part of 
general government for legal and statistical purposes). It is interesting to note, however, 
that if contributions were provided a similar rate as thus far (365m€ over two years), RF 
would only be able to fund an operation of the size of BES’ recap on its own after more 
than 25 years, assuming it would not be called upon until then. 
11. Assess the resolution financing structure. Why did the banks prefer to 
finance a larger part of the recap upfront? Why do the loans’ spreads increase with 
time? 
A plausible interpretation is that the impact on banks’ income statements of a loan 
(neutral or positive) was completely different from that of a special contribution 
(negative, would be considered an expense). For these reasons they acceded to financing 
a much larger part of the operation upfront. As for the loan spreads, they are intended to 
incentivize a quick sale of NB, in order for the government to be repaid sooner. 
12. Why only junior bondholders? What is the rationale for the criteria used to 
discriminate creditor classes?  
State aid rules in place (see endnote n) at the time did not allow for public funds 
to be used without bailing-in junior bondholders and shareholders.  
The idea is that creditors who took riskier positions, with better returns, should be 
first to bear losses. Junior bondholders will receive, eventually, liquidation proceeds from 
the bad bank. The way BES’ assets were split means there may be some recovery 
eventually (hence the non-zero price they traded for even after the resolution), but likely 
not much – especially since BdP seems to be legally allowed to rearrange assets and 
liabilities between the bad bank and NB at any given time according to its interpretation 
of resolution legislation (as it did in December 2013 with debt owed by BES to a Goldman 
Sachs SPV) casting great uncertainty over the recovery rates. 
13. Why are authorities so keen to promote bail-ins and not commit public 
funds? Are there other issues that might surface like this? In this case, who pays the 
€4.9bn bill? 
Many European countries’ governments were forced to provide significant 
amounts of cash to recapitalise banks during the financial crisis, leading to intensified 
political pressure in order to create mechanisms to prevent tax proceeds to be used, in a 
large scale, for bank rescue. Moreover, one of the major causes identified by economists 
in academia and government for the European sovereign debt crisis was the so-called 
«bank-sovereign loop»: doubts on banks’ solvency lead to potential government bailouts, 
which in turn jeopardise government solvency and increase potential taxes, which 
negatively affect the economic outlook, in turn further damaging banks’ prospects, and 
so on. Banking Union reforms, including rules on resolution and bail-out, have «breaking 
the loop» as one of their main objectives. 
However, there are other issues that might surface. It is clear, for one, that by 
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increasing their risk, the cost of funding for European banks will rise. (Some argue that 
this might be appropriate, as the possibility of bailouts represented an implicit subsidy 
from government to banks – add reference). Also, the contributions to resolution funds – 
especially large, “extraordinary” ones when a negative event occurs and the fund is 
undercapitalised, as happened in Spain – impose an additional cost on banks. It is likely 
that not only bank shareholders, but also consumers will be affected, through bank 
commissions, fees, and interest. This is the case here, where the €4.9 will be paid by banks 
to RF over years to come. 
Another problem is the unpredictable consequences if there is a problem in a large, 
multinational bank – almost 40% of securities other than shares issued by banks in Europe 
are held by other banks (ECB data). So if a big, systemic bank goes bust (or a subsidiary 
thereof) and its bondholders are bailed in (especially once senior bonds are also affected), 
this could cause significant problems for all the country’s (or Eurozone) banks, which 
have to write that bank’s debt down, bear losses, and maybe require additional capital. 
Note that even in the case of BES, Crédit Agricole’s Q2 profits were wiped out because 
of the resolution. 
14. How do you explain the behaviour of share and bond prices in July? What 
might have gone wrong? 
Stock and sub bond prices follow very similar patterns: they begin to fall steeply 
on June 30th, when the first major signs of stress became public, falling even more a few 
days later, as more information was released (such as the Q2 report) – 10 p.p. of par in 
the most panicky market days –, seems to demonstrate that the market was fairly aware 
there was a risk of “bail-in”. With the news of the rights issue’s success, they recovered 
slightly, to almost 90% of par, until, in the last couple of trading days before the 
resolution, they completely crash (the biggest sell-offs occur on Thursday). 
It is difficult to justify the dimension of this crash without considering that some 
market participants must have been aware that the resolution was taking place the ensuing 
weekend. Those participants would be at an unfair advantage over the others, as they 
already knew that the shares – and to a lesser extent, the sub bonds – would become 
worthless over the weekend. At the same time, at least earlier that week and the week 
before – and perhaps until the very end – many investors surely must have seen an 
opportunity in BES stocks at such a low price, especially considering the news of strong 
purchases by Goldman Sachs on behalf of its clients: "This purchase passes on some 
security to the market and can open the door for other institutional investors”, a trader 
said at the timexv. If CMVM, the market regulator, had been informed sooner – as soon 
as plans for the resolution began to be made, at least on July 30th – it might have 
suspended trading at that time.  
Senior bonds also suffer in the crisis period (July), also trading below par, but to 
a much smaller degree. After the resolution, they recover as its holders became the 
creditors of a newly solid, toxic assets-free, bank. It is interesting to note that up until the 
last days of June, the price of sub bonds was still above that of senior securities, implying 
that the market, until that time, considered the risk premium they offered (about 4%) was 
still enough to account for the additional risk they entailed. 
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